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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-
103(2) Q). 
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. 
Edgar, District Court Case No. 131403330, on Jnne 24, 2015 (R. 236-39; attached at 
Addendum A). Appellant Michael Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal on July 23, 
2015. (R. 240-41.) This case initially came under the jurisdiction of the Utah 
Supreme Court, but the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. 
Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: In regards to the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Administration 
agent, (1) did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the testimony 
or (2) was Mr. Edgar's attorney ineffective when he failed to properly object? 
Standard of Review: 11 A trial court's ruling nnder rule 403 is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ,I 47, 52 P.3d 1210. 11 A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
question of law that the court reviews for correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 
,I 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the prejudicial nature of the 
agent's testimony during trial. (R. 429.) But, if the attorney's objection was not 
1 
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specific enough, then Mr. Edgar's argument on appeal is not preserved; but an 
"exception to the preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to 
preserve the issue in the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." 
State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ,r 35,276 P.3d 1207. 
Issue 2: Was Mr. Edgar's attorney ineffective when he failed to object to the 
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the 
morning of trial? 
Standard of Review: "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for 
correctness." Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 11 (quotation omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is not preserved, but an "exception to the 
preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in 
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." Kozlov, 2012 UT 
App 114, ,r 35. 
Determinative Provisions 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d) 
( d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before 
trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not 
2 
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prejudiced. If an additional or different offense is charged, the defendant has the 
right to a preliminary hearing on that offense as provided under these rules and 
any continuance as necessary to meet the amendment. The court may permit an 
indictment or information to be amended after the trial has commenced but before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of 
the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may 
be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts. 
Utah R. Evid. 403: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
3 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The State originally charged Appellant Michael Edgar with one count of 
theft by receiving stolen property, nine counts of possession with intent to 
distribute, and one count of use or possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 1-3.) The 
State later amended the possession charges to include an allegation that Mr. Edgar 
possessed drugs and paraphernalia within a drug-free zone. (R. 170-71.) 
A jury convicted Mr. Edgar on all counts and determined that Mr. Edgar 
possessed drugs and paraphernalia within a drug-free zone. (R. 178-88.) 
2. Statement of Facts 
2.1 Mr. Edgar is arrested. 
In November 2013, a man found out about a fairly new trailer that was being 
sold for a very low price. (R. 359.) The man suspected the trailer was stolen. (R. 
359-60.) The police1 became involved, and when the man went to meet the seller 
of the trailer-Mr. Edgar-the police intervened and arrested Mr. Edgar. (R. 362, 
364, 367.) 
When he was arrested, Mr. Edgar had been driving a car. (R. 379.) The car 
was not his; it was registered to others. (R. 459-60.) Mr. Edgar told the police that 
1 Officer Boren was the primary officer on that investigated and arrested Mr. 
Edgar. (R. 376.) Before Mr. Edgar's trial, Officer Boren killed his two young 
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he was borrowing the car from a friend. (R. 460-61.) After his arrest, the police did 
an inventory impound search of the car and found a briefcase in the trunk. (R. 382-
84.} An officer popped open the locked briefcase with a screwdriver and found 
various drugs and a scale. (R. 385-86.) 
2.2 The State charges Mr. Edgar and amends the Information the 
morning of trial. 
The State initially charged Mr. Edgar by Information with, among other 
things, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. (R. 1-3.) The 
State later amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with possession with 
intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia within a drug-free zone. 
(R. 27-29.) The State alleged in the Amended Information that Mr. Edgar 
committed the crime within 1,000 feet of a ballet school. (R. 29.) The ballet school, 
however, was over 1,000 feet from where Mr. Edgar was arrested. (Add. C, R. 809.) 
The morning that trial began, at around 8:30am, the district court, the 
prosecutor, and the defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. (Id.) 
The prosecutor brought to that conference a Second Amended Information, where, 
for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with committing a crime within 1,000 
feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW, 
making it a drug-free zone." (Add. C, R. 809-10.) 
5 
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The prosecutor asked for permission to file the Second Amended 
Information. (Add. C, R. 811.) The district court stated that it would allow the State 
to file the Second Amended Information if the State called an owner or operator of 
the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish proper foundation for the new 
drug-free zone. (Add. C, R. 810.) The State found one of the owners of the facility, 
and she testified later that day. (Id.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did some quick Google 
research on the facility, and he interviewed the owner for the first and only time 
during a break in the trial proceedings that morning. (Add. C, R. 810-11.) 
The owner did testify about the sports facility, and the prosecutor argued in 
his closing statement that based on the information elicited from the owner during 
her testimony, Mr. Edgar was within a drug-free zone when he was arrested. (R. 
390, 585-86.) 
2.3 A witness testifies about a connection between Mr. Edgar and 
high-level drug dealers. 
During trial, a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent testified that 
about seven months after the charged conduct in this case, Mr. Edgar called him 
and said "he was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to heroin 
trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating out of the Salt Lake City area 
and that he would do so in exchange for consideration with his pending charges 
in Utah County." (Add. B, R. 411, 418, 419.) The agent testified that Mr. Edgar 
6 
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specified that the trafficker dealt in "pounds of heroin," which was valued at 
around $20,000. (Add. B, R. 423.) Then the agent stated that Mr. Edgar discussed 
working with other law enforcement officers, and Mr. Edgar objected. (Add. B, R. 
424-25.) Outside of the hearing of the jury, Mr. Edgar elaborated on his objection, 
noting "[t]he prejudicial nature of the testimony, there's other cases, he's working 
with other officers here in [the] state of Utah, that don't pertain necessarily to this 
case and we're looking at the facts for November 7, 2013 and what he was doing 
at that time." (Add. B, R. 429.) 
The district court granted the objection in part. Specifically, the district court 
did not allow information about Mr. Edgar's prior contact with law enforcement 
officers. (Add. B, R. 430.) But the court did conclude that the evidence of Mr. Edgar 
contacting the agent and informing the agent of his access to heroin traffickers was 
probative. (Id.) After the ruling, the prosecutor asked the agent another question, 
mentioning Mr. Edgar's "ability to access pounds of heroin and a potential 
Mexican drug trafficker." (Add. B, R. 431-32.) 
The prosecutor again referenced the DEA agent's testimony in closing, 
when he stated that Mr. Edgar's conversation with the agent was "very telling." 
(R. 593.) The prosecutor told the jury, "[W]ould we be using our common sense, 
our life experience be able to reach out and track down the DEA and say, Hey, I've 
got these state charges, these drug charges, need some help with them, can you 
7 
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contact the prosecutor? What are you willing to do for me? I've got connections to 
a Mexican cartel and I can help you bust someone with pounds of heroin. Well, 
what a coincidence, we actually have some heroin in this case and tons of other 
drugs." (R. 593.) The evidence at trial showed that the officers found 546 
milligrams -1 / 56 of an ounce - of heroin in the briefcase in the car Mr. Edgar was 
driving. (R. 506-07.)2 The jury convicted Mr. Edgar on all counts. 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Edgar raises two issues on appeal: 
First, the DEA agent's testimony about Mr. Edgar's connection to a heroin 
trafficker should not have been admitted into evidence. The evidence associated 
Mr. Edgar with a highly disliked and dangerous group-Mexican heroin 
traffickers - when there was no evidence that connected the trafficker with any of 
the charged crimes. Such an association was unduly prejudicial and insufficiently 
probative.3 
2 The detective that discovered the drugs initially testified that the amount of 
heroin found was 14 grams. (R. 454.) But then he testified that he found "less than 
a gram" of heroin. (R. 466.) Finally, the forensic scientist who tested the heroin 
testified that the amount of heroin found was actually 546 milligrams, which is 
less than half a gram or 1/56 of an ounce. (R. 486-88, 496, 506-07.) 
3 The DEA agent also testified against Mr. Edgar in another case. That case is 
currently pending on appeal. See State v. Edgar, No. 20150594-CA. Mr. Edgar 
makes similar arguments about the DEA agent's testimony in this case and in No. 
20150594. 
8 
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Second, Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not object to the 
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the 
morning trial began. The Second Amended Information changed the location of 
the drug-free zone, and Mr. Edgar was substantially prejudiced by the admission 




The DEA agent's prejudicial testimony should not have been allowed 
into evidence. 
During trial, a DEA agent offered testimony about Mr. Edgar's association 
with a drug trafficker working out of the Salt Lake area who dealt with pounds of 
heroin. That testimony was more prejudicial than probative and should have been 
excluded under Utah R. Evid. 403. Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the testimony, 
arguing that it was prejudicial, and the district court overruled that objection. 
The argument here is two-fold: (1) the district court abused its discretion 
when it allowed into evidence the DEA agent's prejudicial testimony, and (2) in 
the alternative, if Mr. Edgar's attorney's prejudice objection was not timely or 
sufficiently specific, then Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to timely 
and specifically object to the prejudicial nature of the testimony. 
9 
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1.1 The district cowt abused its discretion when it allowed the DEA 
agent's testimony into evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 403 allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." 
Here, the minimal evidentiary value of the DEA agent's testimony was 
significantly outweighed by the prejudicial nature of that testimony, and the 
district court should have excluded the testimony. 
The DEA agent's evidence was insufficiently probative. The probative value of 
the DEA agent's testimony was low. When weighing evidence under Rule 403, 
"courts may consider many factors" and are "bound by the text of rule 403." State 
v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ,r 18.4 
The evidence here was ultimately unhelpful in aiding the jury in 
determining what actually happened in November 2013, when Mr. Edgar was 
arrested. For instance, the agent's testimony was nonspecific and general: the 
agent testified Mr. Edgar had "access to a heroin trafficker who was capable of 
moving large quantities of heroin." (Add. B, R. 422.) No evidence existed that the 
drug trafficker was involved in the charged crimes. See United States v. Espinoza, 
4 The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "it strikes us as inappropriate for a 
court to discuss the need for the evidence or the efficacy of alternative proof when 
the court is analyzing only whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial." Cuttler, 
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244 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (excluding evidence of defendant's sons' drug 
convictions because there was no evidence that sons were involved in charged 
crime); United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that 
defendant's contact with individuals who had convictions for drug-related 
offenses was irrelevant to whether defendant was engaged in a drug conspiracy). 
And although the prosecutor made much of the fact that heroin was also 
found in the car Mr. Edgar was driving, what was found was 1/ 56 of an ounce-
a far cry from the "pounds of heroin" distributed by the trafficker. (Compare Add. 
B, R. 423 with R. 506-07.) 
Furthermore, the evidence did not relay any information about what 
occurred in November 2013; it did not shed any light on whether Mr. Edgar knew 
the briefcase was in the back of the car he was driving or whether Mr. Edgar knew 
that the briefcase contained drugs. 
Rather than relay information about what happened the day Mr. Edgar was 
arrested, the evidence merely associated Mr. Edgar with high-level drug 
traffickers without making any connection between the traffickers and the charged 
crimes. The evidence did not aid the jury in its determination of whether Mr. Edgar 
possessed drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
The DEA agent's testimony was unfairly prejudicial. "The critical question in a 
rule 403 analysis for unfair prejudice is whether certain[] testimony is so 
11 
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prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence." State v. Jones, 
2015 UT 19, ,I 30, 345 P.3d 1195 (quotations omitted). "Additionally, evidence is 
not unfairly prejudicial because it tends to prove guilt, but because it tends to 
encourage the jury to find guilt from improper reasoning." Id. (quotations 
omitted). Improper reasoning includes finding a defendant guilty merely because 
of an association with others (" guilt by association"), State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, 
,I 37,345 P.3d 1168, or finding a defendant guilty because of irrelevant emotional 
considerations, Robinson v. Taylor, 2015 UT 69, ,I 34, 356 P.3d 1230; State v. White, 
880 P.2d 18, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The evidence of Mr. Edgar's association with a heroin trafficker encouraged 
the jury to engage in improper reasoning because the evidence both influenced the 
jury to find guilt by association and stirred up irrelevant emotional considerations. 
Here, the DEA agent linked Mr. Edgar with a "heroin trafficker that was 
operating out of the Salt Lake City area" who "was capable of moving large 
quantities of heroin," "pounds of heroin" with a street value of $20,000. ( Add. B, 
R. 419, 422-23.) The prosecutor then summarized the agent's testimony, noting 
that Mr. Edgar had an "ability to access pounds of heroin and a potential Mexican 
drug trafficker." (Add. B, R. 431-32.) Then in closing the prosecutor mentioned 
that Mr. Edgar "had connections to a Mexican cartel." (R. 593.) 
12 
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The agent's testimony, linking Mr. Edgar to the Mexican drug cartel 
operating locally, "appeal[ed] to the jury's passions or prejudices" and attempted 
"to associate the defendant with a feared ... group" -a foreign drug cartel. See 
United States v. Reynolds, 534 F. App'x 347, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that 
prosecutor's argument that a defendant brought Mexican drug cartels into the 
local community appealed to the jury's passions and constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct) (quotation omitted). 
Not only did the evidence appeal to the jury's passions, the evidence 
"implicitly associated" Mr. Edgar with a Mexican drug trafficker, even though 
there was no evidence of any connection between Mr. Edgar and the trafficker in 
the charged crime. See United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (holding testimony that implicitly associated the defendant with a drug 
cartel was prejudicial, especially when an association with the cartel did not bear 
on any element of the charged crime); see generally United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 
1008, 1017 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(reasoning that the testimony that portrayed the defendant "as a member of an 
enormous international drug trafficking organization and implied that he knew of 
the drugs in his car because of his role in that organization" was prejudicial 
because the defendant "was not alleged to be associated with a drug trafficking 
organization in even the most minor way"). 
13 
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Here, all the evidence proved was that Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers. That's 
it. No evidence-not even a hint of an allegation-existed that the drug dealers 
were connected with the charged crimes. The jury realizing that Mr. Edgar knew 
some drug dealers was utterly unhelpful in determining whether Mr. Edgar 
possessed drugs on the night he was arrested. 
But what the evidence did do was raise an impermissible inference that 
because Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer. See United States 
v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that "guilt by 
association" evidence is "irrelevant to the question of a defendant's actual guilt" 
and is not probative; consequently, evidence that a defendant "knew a criminal" 
should have been excluded); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 
1999) ( excluding evidence that "tended to establish guilt by association - because 
[the defendants] cavorted with drug dealers, they must be drug dealers 
themselves"); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317,319 (6th Cir. 1983) (reasoning 
that prosecutor's questioning about defendant's association with a drug dealer 
created an inference that "because [the defendant] maintained a relationship with 
a convicted cocaine dealer, [the defendant] himself was somehow prone to 
criminal activity of the same sort"). The agent's testimony inferred guilt by 
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that Mr. Edgar should be punished, "regardless of his liability in this particular 
case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69, 1 37. 
The error was not harmless. Mr. Edgar was harmed by the evidence. An 
appellate court "will not disturb the jury's verdict unless the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." 
State v. High, 2012 UT App 180,141,282 P.3d 1046 (quotation omitted). "Harmless 
errors are those that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood 
exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Id. (quotations 
omitted). 
Here, the State's evidence against Mr. Edgar was not overwhelming. The 
drugs were found in a briefcase that was locked inside the trunk of the car that Mr. 
Edgar was borrowing from a friend. (R. 379, 382-86, 460-61.) Furthermore, when 
the police arrested Mr. Edgar, it was in connection with a stolen trailer-Mr. Edgar 
was not suspected of dealing drugs nor did the police suggest that any of Mr. 
Edgar's conduct was indicative of drug dealing. (R. 362, 364, 367, 382-84.) The 
police never mentioned that they saw Mr. Edgar distribute or purchase drugs. 
Because the evidence against Mr. Edgar was not overwhelming, the agent's 
testimony that Mr. Edgar had connections with a high-level drug dealer could 
have influenced the jury to find Mr. Edgar guilty based on a person he knew rather 
than on the facts presented at trial. 
15 
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1.2 Alternatively, Mr. Edgar's hial counsel was ineffective for not 
appropriately objecting to the DEA agent's testimony. 
Mr. Edgar's attorney objected to the "prejudicial nature" of the agent's 
testimony. (Add. B, R. 429.) Although this should be sufficient to preserve the 
prejudice argument for appeal, if this Court determines that the argument was not 
adequately preserved, then Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to 
timely raise an objection to the testimony on the basis of prejudice. 
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the 
Strickland5 standard, which requires a defendant to prove "(1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different." 
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, iJ 18,321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving that 
his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
requires [the defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, iJ 34, 247 P.3d 344 ( quotations omitted). Sound trial strategy 
does not require trial counsel to submit a motion or lodge an objection that would 
be futile. State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, iJ 33, 248 P.3d 984. 
5 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
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Here, the failure of Mr. Edgar's trial counsel to timely object to the testimony 
on the basis of prejudice constituted deficient performance. Throughout the 
agent's testimony, trial counsel objected on the basis of relevance. (Add. B, R. 411, 
413-14, 415,417, 420.) 
In conjunction with the relevance objection, trial counsel should have also 
objected on the basis of prejudice under Utah R. Evid. 403. An attorney in trial 
counsel's position should have realized that testimony that links a defendant 
charged with a drug crime to a high-level drug trafficker -when there is no 
evidence that the drug trafficker was involved in the charged crime- is unfairly 
prejudicial. See Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d at 1398 (holding testimony that 
implicitly associated the defendant with a drug cartel was prejudicial, especially 
when an association with the cartel did not bear on any element of the charged 
crime). Furthermore, trial counsel should have known that an objection to 
relevance does not encompass an objection on the basis of prejudice. See State v. 
Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ~ 72,311 P.3d 538. And trial counsel should have known 
that objections must be timely and specific. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ~ 14, 128 
P.3d 1171. 
Moreover, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object. 
As argued more thoroughly in section 1.1, supra, the agent's testimony linking Mr. 
Edgar to the Mexican drug cartel operating locally "appeal[ ed] to the jury's 
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passions or prejudices" and attempted "to associate the defendant with a feared . 
. . group." Reynolds, 534 F. App'x 347, 367-68. 
And the testimony-which only proved that Mr. Edgar knew drug 
dealers - raised an impermissible inference that because Mr. Edgar knew drug 
dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer. See Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 741-42; Marshall, 
173 F.3d at 1317; Pritchett, 699 F.2d at 319. The agent's testimony inferred guilt by 
association and was highly prejudicial because it may have led the jury to conclude 
that Mr. Edgar should be punished, "regardless of his liability in this particular 
case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69, ,r 37. For these reasons, the district court should have 
excluded the testimony had Mr. Edgar's attorney timely and specifically objected 
to the testimony on the basis of prejudice. 
Because the jury rendered its verdict based on evidence that should have 
been excluded, Mr. Edgar asks this Court to reverse the verdict and remand to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
2. Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he did not object to the 
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information 
Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective when he failed to object to the State's 
request for permission to file the Second Amended Information the morning trial 
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the Second Amended Information prevented Mr. Edgar from fully developing his 
defense. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires the defendant to prove 
deficient performance and prejudice. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,I 18. 
Mr. Edgar's attorney performed deficiently when he did not object to the 
State's request for permission to file the Second Amended Information or ask for 
a continuance. "The court may permit an information to be amended at any time 
before trial has commenced so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are 
not prejudiced." Utah R. Crim. P. 4( d). For a defendant to be subject to the drug-
free zone sentencing enhancement, the finder of fact must determine that certain 
actions occurred within a certain distance from a particular location. Utah Code § 
58-37-8(4)(a). 
When the State initially charged Mr. Edgar, it did not allege that the 
charged crimes occurred within a drug-free zone. (See R. 1-3.) Rather, the State 
amended the information shortly thereafter to allege that certain charged crimes 
occurred in a drug-free zone, namely, within 1,000 feet of a ballet school. (R. 29.) 
However, that ballet school was over 1,000 feet from where Mr. Edgar was 
arrested. (Add. C, R. 809.) 
It was not until 11 months later, on the morning trial began, that the State 
presented a Second Amended Information that alleged for the first time that Mr. 
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Edgar was in drug-free zone because he was within 1,000 feet of a sports facility. 
(R. 30, 809-10.) Because of the timing of the filing of the Second Amended 
Information, Mr. Edgar's attorney only had enough time to do some brief Google 
research and talk to the State's witness during a break in trial proceedings. (Add. 
C, R. 810-11.) 
Mr. Edgar's attorney should have objected to the State's request for 
permission to file the Second Amended Information because it substantially 
prejudiced the rights of Mr. Edgar. Mr. Edgar prepared for trial for several months 
knowing that the State's allegation that Mr. Edgar committed a crime within a 
drug-free zone-i.e., within 1,000 feet of a ballet school-was unsupported by the 
evidence. And when the State sought to amend the Information to change the 
location of the drug-free zone, Mr. Edgar's attorney had little time to investigate 
the new location. The timing of the Second Amended Information hindered Mr. 
Edgar's ability to prepare his own defense. Mr. Edgar's attorney should have 
objected to the State's request to file the Second Amended Information or at least 
requested a continuance of the trial so that he could prepare a defense. 
The failure of Mr. Edgar's attorney to object or ask for a continuance 
prejudiced Mr. Edgar. Mr. Edgar's attorney could not thoroughly investigate the 
new location of the drug-free zone; specifically, Mr. Edgar's attorney could not 
measure the distance between the new location and the place where Mr. Edgar 
20 
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was arrested, nor could Mr. Edgar's attorney investigate the type of business done 
at the new location. 
Mr. Edgar's attorney ,-vas ineffective for failing to object to the State's 
request for permission to file a Second Amended Information and for failing to ask 
for a continuance to prepare a defense. Because Mr. Edgar was substantially 
prejudiced, Mr. Edgar requests that this Court reverse the jury's finding that Mr. 
Edgar committed the charged crimes ,,vithin a drug-free zone. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court reverse the jury's verdict. 
Not only was the jury exposed to evidence that should have been excluded - the 
DEA agent's testimony that associated Mr. Edgar ,vith a Mexican heroin 
trafficker-but Mr. Edgar was also prejudiced when the State amended the 
Information the morning of trial to include a new location for the drug-free zone. 
For these reasons, Mr. Edgar requests that this Court reverse. 
DA TED this 12 day of March, 2016. 
Em~ 
ADAMS LEGAL LLC 
P.O. Box 1564 
Bountiful, UT 84011 
eadams@adamslegalllc.com 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
FILED 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant. 
custody: Utah county Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: treenah 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEWART, GREGORY V 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 16, 1980 
Audio 
Tape Number: 301-15 Tape Count: 11:36 
CHARGES 
Case No: 131403330 FS 
Judge: 
Date: 
LYNN W DAVIS 
June 24, 2015 
1. THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
2. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
3. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
4. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
5. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
6. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - let Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
7. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
8. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
9. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
10. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
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Case No: 131403330 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
11. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/10/2015 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years (ii 
in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years (i) 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant 1 s conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 1st Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years 
and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
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Case No: 131403330 Date: Jun 24, 2015 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Court sentences defendant to 257 days on the Class A Misdemeanor with credit for time 
served. Sentence to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends Defendant not serve a lengthy sentence. Court recommends defendant be 
given credit for time served of 257 days, the court also recommends defendant 
participate in the Conquest Program. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class 
A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time 
suspended for this charge is 108 day(s). 
Credit is granted for 257 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge ff 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $5000.00 
Charge# 2 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 3 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 4 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
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Charge# 5 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 6 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge fl 7 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 8 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 9 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 10 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $10000.00 
Charge# 11 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $2S00.00 
Total Fine: $97500.00 
Total Suspended: $97500.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
CUSTODY 
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail. 
Date\~MJl6 
Printed: 06/25/15 08:12:30 PacQ339 4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Tab B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AddendumB 
Excerpt from DEA agent's testimony (R. 408-32) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 



























THE COURT: Argument outside the presence of the 
jury. Thank you. 
(Whereupon a lunch recess was taken) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record in the case of 
State of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330. The 
record will reflect that counsel and clients are present, 
that the jury is seated. 
And Mr. Johnson, you may call your next witness. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Judge. We will be getting 
to Detective Purvis's testimony a little later on. The State 
would call Agent Brandon Holmer. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's have you raise your right 
hand and be sworn by the Clerk of the Court then. 
BRANDON LEE HOLMER 
having been first duly sworn, testified 
upon his oath as follows: 
THE COURT: You may be seated. Invite you to speak 
up clearly for the benefit of the record and also clearly for 
the benefit of the jury seated to your left. I advise every 
witness if a question is confusing to you, please advise me 
and I'll have counsel restate it for your benefit. Thank you 
for being here. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
Q Good afternoon. 
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A Good afternoon. 
Q Will you state your full name and spell your last 
name for the jury please? 
A My name is Brandon Lee Holmer, last name is spelled 
H-O-L-M-E-R. 
Q And what do you do for a living, sir? 






Okay, short that is DEA, right? 
Yes, sir. 
Okay. How long have you been with them? 
Since July of 2004. 
Q 
A 
Okay, and before that what did you do for a living? 
I served with the U.S. military and I performed 
duties during part of that time in the Utah National Guard 
Counter Drug Program where I served as an analyst for 
approximately six years. 
Okay, and before that? Q 
A U.S. Army Special Forces in the Utah National Guard 
and LDS Mission to Argentina. 
Q All right. We can stop there. Won't go into your 
high school English grades or anything. 
A Thank you. 
Q What sort of occupational experience do you have 
with drug interdiction? 
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A Aside from the time that I spent with the FBI, 
District Attorney's Office in Salt Lake on a task force and 
working for the State Bureau of Investigation as an analyst, 
I was trained in the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia. It 
was approximately 17 weeks at the time and they cover a 
myriad of instruction in how to perform your duties a special 
agent. 
Q And what is drug interdiction? I guess I should 
start with that. 
A Drug interdiction is basically trying to staunch 
the supply of drugs to the streets to getting out and 
becoming available for users. 
Q Okay. And so what exactly does, in your current 
capacity as a DEA, what does the DEA do? Is it state level, 
federal or what? 
A So, the DEA was formed in, I believe 1973 
specifically with the aim of reducing the supply of narcotics 
and also controlling legal controlled substances. We focus 
on federal level cases and if appropriate we'll prosecute at 
other levels. 
Q And when you say federal level, is that, what's 
that determined by? 
A What level a case is prosecuted at, there's some 
discretion at the investigative level but primarily it's 
based on what legislators determine to be appropriate for 
0410 
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certain offenses. So specifically, they have laid out, the 
U.S. Congress has laid out certain levels of drugs should be 
punished at a certain level. So generally we don't prosecute 
anything below a five year - or below a 10-year minimum 
mandatory in the federal system. 
Q When we're talking - without going into the 
mandatory - how does that relate to quantity or across state 
lines, things like that? 
A So, for federal level prosecution it needs to be 
fairly serious drug offenses in terms of the -
MR. STEWART: I'm going to object to this. I don't 
see how it's relevant to the case at hand. 
MR. JOHNSON: Giving some background to give 
context to a conversation this agent had with the defendant, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's move through it 
quickly as it relates to this -
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, certainly. 
THE COURT: - I'll reserve as it relates to 
sustaining or overruling the objection. Let's give it -
Q 
A 
(BY MR. JOHNSON) Can you summarize that then? 
We're looking for traffickers, not users, people 
that are moving major quantities of drugs. 
Q Okay, and in your - so on a day-to-day daily 
responsibilities in your job, not talking about the DEA in 
u4·1 ·1 
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general, what do you do? 
A That's the beauty of the job I guess is it depends. 
It can be anything from training, anything from tactical to, 
to investigative type things, search warrant surveillance, a 
lot of time spent writing, documenting what's going on and 
then working with confidential sources. 
Q And what role do confidential sources play in your 
job? 
A Specifically they give us access to drug 
trafficking organizations. They give us information and 
they'll actually deal with drug traffickers. It's pretty 
hard for to walk in off the street and convince a guy that 
I'm a bad guy and he should sell me drugs. 
Q Okay. We'll get some more information in a minute. 
We'll jump ahead. So drawing your attention to July 29 th of 
last year, did you give me a call? 
A 
Q 
Y~s, I did. 
Why was that? 
A I'd been contacted by an individual who was later 
identified as Michael Edgar. He called me on the duty phone. 
I was serving as the duty agent at that time. 
Q Explain the duty phone to the jury. 
A So the duty phone goes along with the 
responsibility of taking any incoming cases to the office and 
it's a publically available number. If you call our office, 
130 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 


























our office phone after hours, it refers you to the duty phone 
and we're responsible to answer it in case someone has an 
emergency or they want to report drug trafficking activities. 
Q In this case it just happened to be -
MR. STEWART: Judge, could we approach? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
(Whereupon a side bar was held as follows: 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) to this case (inaudible). 
THE COURT: How would it be - I mean, you can 
present it as it relates to rebuttal but what is it? 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Ahhh, I think it is. We can make a 
record outside the presence of the jury but if it's contacted 
independently as it relates to the resolution of the case, 
you can have some discussions. Okay? 
(End of sidebar) 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) So you were talking about the 
duty phone. So were you, just happened to be - was it your 
turn or do you do it every night or what? 
A No, it goes a week at a time. We rotate through 
the 17 or 18 agents that are in the office. 
Q Okay, and how soon before you called me did he call 
you to the best of your recollection? 
A To the best of my recollection it was the previous 
day and during our discussion he told me that the prosecutor, 
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Craig Johnson, was the guy handling his case and so that's 





Okay. I didn't seek you out independently? 
No. 
Your contact came from Mr. Edgar? 
That's correct. 
Q And what did he say to you when he got ahold of you 
on the phone? 
MR. STEWART: Judge, just for the record, we would 
object to this on the grounds of relevance to this case. 
THE COURT: I don't know the relevance. We can 
address it outside the presence of the jury if you wish to. 
MR. JOHNSON: I think my proffer at the bench 
should be sufficient for us to continue with the line of 
questioning at this point. 
THE COURT: But let's make a record outside the 
presence of the jury then. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in light of that 
we will take up a legal discussion outside the presence of 
the jury, excuse you at this point in time and caution you 
not to discuss the case with anyone. If you've taken notes, 
don't show those to anyone and don't attempt to learn 
anything about this case outside this courtroom setting. Of 
course avoid any radio, TV, newspaper, comments about the 
trial. With that we'll excuse the jury, then we'll take up 
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these matters outside your presence and once I've ruled then 
we will invite you back in. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: The jury has been excused. There is an 
objection. The basis hasn't been stated on the record and, 
counsel, you may state that basis. You may then respond. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, again, just to make this 
perfectly clear for the record, I object on the basis of 
relevance to this case. This case happened in November of 
2013. 
THE COURT: This contact was July 29, 2015. 
MR. STEWART: '14. 
THE COURT: '14, excuse me, all right. Okay. 
MR. STEWART: Seven or eight months after this. 
THE COURT: Now I don't know the facts involved 
here and you can respond briefly to that and we may need to 
take some testimony so that in fact I can -
MR. JOHNSON: Let's just do that. I'll just ask a 
couple of questions and we'll see where that takes us. 
THE COURT: Okay, very well. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, why did Mr. Edgar 
indicate that he was contacting you? 
A He was seeking consideration with pending charges 
by cooperating with law enforcement on other cases. 
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A To my knowledge his charges were at state level. 
MR. JOHNSON: And Judge, the Court can take 
judicial notice that this case, among several others were 
pending at the time of this conversation with Agent Holmer 
and the defendant. I was the prosecutor on all of those 
cases. 
THE COURT: So he would cooperate with a federal 
agent as it relates to -
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) What did he want you to do if he 
cooperated? 
A He seemed to believe that I could supercede the 







How did my name get brought up with respect to 
He told me that you were the prosecutor. 
Okay. And that by contacting me, what might 
A That he might be given a stay on the current status 
of these charges or a reduction in his charges because of my 
involvement and his cooperation with us. 
THE COURT: And did he promise anything in 
connection with that as it relates to cooperation? 
THE WITNESS: Obviously -
THE COURT: Your tie is running into the mike. 
U410 
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THE WITNESS: Sorry. 
THE COURT: It's all right. 
THE WITNESS: So, so whenever someone contacts me 
I'm going to try and determine what their usefulness is to 
the government. So I questioned him about what he would be 
willing to provide, what level of trafficker he could give me 
access to and what actions he could take specifically with 
regard to that activity. 
Q 
A 
(BY MR. JOHNSON) How did he respond to that? 
He indicated that he had access to a high level 
Mexican heroin trafficker that operated out of the Salt Lake 
City area. 
Q Okay, how much, how much quantity-wise of drugs 
could he get access to? 
A Pound level quantities. So significant 
distribution quantities. Anytime there's going to be pound 
loads of heroin, we're obviously interested. That's a fairly 
good sized trafficker. (i 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, based on that I think the 
relevance has been established. 
THE COURT: Anything further, counsel? 
MR. STEWART: Ummm - no, Judge, we'll stand on 
what's been presented (inaudible) the objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'll overrule the 
objection to outside the presence of the jury I make a 
u4·1 r 
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determination as it relates to the nature of the 
conversations, the basis of the conversation and the 
projection as it relates to the usefulness of the information 
that could be provided and that it related specifically to 
this pending, these pending charges because there's a 
reference directly to Mr. Craig Johnson as Deputy Utah County 
Attorney and I will find by virtue of that and the admissions 
involved that it is relevant. 
So we'll invite the jury back in. 
And it's sort of an admission against interest. I 
would make the further observation that there's been 
testimony already that some of the drugs involved were 
heroin; and secondarily, the independent contact by the 
defendant with a federal agent was initiated by him and that 
secondarily that it would be admissions against interest. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: We are back on the record in the case 
of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case No. 131403330. 
Counsel and clients are present, the jury is now seated and 
that we had some testimony elicited outside the presence of 
the jury. The Court has made a ruling and you may proceed 
counsel. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) You said Mr. Edgar contacted you 
on the duty phone around July 28, 2014? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q And describe that conversation from the beginning. 





Okay, so describe the conversation please. 
So Mr. Edgar identified himself, told me that he 
was seeking to cooperate with law enforcement in regard to 
heroin trafficking or heroin trafficker that was operating 
out of the Salt Lake City area and that he would do so in 
exchange for consideration with his pending charges in Utah 
County. He identified Mr. Johnson as the prosecutor over his 
cases and we had a discussion about what his ability, what he 
could provide, what services he could provide to me 
specifically in the course of investigation. 
THE COURT: Let me have counsel approach just 
quickly and then -
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: He made a generic reference to his 
cases. I don't want any plurality as it relates to this jury 
knowing that there are other pending cases. Now the cases 
could refer to multiple charges in this case certainly but if 
you will instruct him that I've got to narrow that. It's 
potentially approaching prejudicial if he goes into each of 
the cases and the number of charges and the nature of the 
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THE COURT: Okay, what are we doing to do? It's a 
fine balance as it relates to that because I don't want all 
four cases to be before this jury -
MR. JOHNSON: It would be those two, but 
(inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. What do you do? How do you 
protect your client? 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. I know. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, yeah, he probably did. Umrnm, if 
you will just advise this witness that beyond what he has 
testified to or he heard from him that he can't open the door 
to all the other cases that are pending and everything else 
that way. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: I know. If there's a specificity but 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) irrelevant to this case. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: Approach again if you will, counsel. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: Again, even though the discussion may 
-
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be, may involve other cases or other pending charges and it's 
an admission on his part - I think opening that door before 
this jury as it relates to exclusively here is a real 
problem. So I don't know how to resolve that, you know, I 
wasn't aware of it until two minutes ago. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) he created it. 
THE COURT: I know he created it. What do you do? 
Is it relevant? It is relevant. It's relevant as it relates 
to the fact that he knows contacts and heroin traffickers and 
everybody else and all that -
Q 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I know. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I don't know. Be cautious. 
(End of sidebar) 
(BY MR. JOHNSON) Okay, Agent Holmer, so to just 
reorient ourselves where we were, Mr. Edgar talked to you, 
called you to talk about working out some considerations, 
some sort of deal on his Utah County charges, drug charges? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. And as part of that, he was talking about 
what he could offer in exchange for you trying to pull some 
strings perhaps? 
A Yes, sir, that's correct. 
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confidential sources as part of your job? 
A Yes, it's a huge part of what we do. 
Q Okay. And so in speaking with Mr. Edgar, I mean, 
what factors play into whether you're going to actually use a 
confidential source? 
A First thing would be what they can actually 
provide, their access and placement to drug traffickers. 
Then there are a number of other factors that we take into 
that which include their ability to be controlled and then 
possibly most important, how truthful and whether or not we 
can trust them which is a delicate matter because anytime 
you're dealing with confidential source, obviously they've 
probably doing something they shouldn't have been doing 
previously. 
Q Okay. And so in talking with Mr. Edgar, 
specifically when you're talking about what he could do for 
you, what was that conversation about? 
A Had to do with specifically access to a heroin 
trafficker who was capable of moving large quantities of 
heroin. 
Q Did you discuss that any further with him about 
what large quantities mean? 
A Well, we had to, as I recall we had to kind of 
break it down because what one person considers a large 
quantity may not necessarily be what I consider a large 
U4LL 
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quantity or something that's worth my time and efforts, just 
quite simply because I get paid by the taxpayers to target 
large trafficking organizations. So, as I recall, we had to 
quantify what large quantities was and I believe it was 
pounds specifically that we discussed, that he was capable of 
dealing in pounds of heroin which, for the record, was worth 
my time. 
Q Okay. Do you happen to know the street value of 
pounds of heroin? 
A I believe it's over $10,000. I think we're paying 
20 for a kilo, something like that, $20,000. I'd have to 
confirm that. 
Q So what else did Mr. Edgar - well, I guess at that 
point were there some baseline rules that you talked to Mr. 
Edgar about working with him? 
A Well, I always try and kind of lay down 
expectations. That's a big part of confidential source 
management is them understanding exactly what we are willing 
to do and not do, what they're allowed to do and not do and 
one thing that I think has some bearing is that we 
established that we do not make promises other than the fact 
that we are going to make recommendations. So I do not 
dictate the terms of their cooperation when they're working 
as a defendant, confidential source, meaning they're giving 
us cooperation in exchange for consideration with charges. 
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We make recommendations to prosecutors and we make 
recommendations to judges but we have no bearing on what they 




And you explained that to Mr. Edgar? 
I explained that almost every time I speak to a 
confidential source whose looking to work with us. 
Q Okay. And was he willing to go along with that 
or ... 
A I believe he understood that. I think I made 
myself very clear. 
Q Did he discuss with you working with any other 
officers on a state level? 
A Yes, he did. And that's another aspect of source 
management, what's important is we, we always try and find 
out if they are currently or have previously worked with 
anyone else in law enforcement. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, can we approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Can't go into any previous or anything 
else that way. There's no - that's improper. 
(Inaudible conversation) 
MR. JOHNSON: Agent Holmer (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: Okay -
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible) his conversation 
(inaudible} in connection with his client (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. STEWART: I (inaudible}. 
THE COURT: What we've got here is that you've got 
the - he can't talk about his past at all. He can talk about 
this case but he can't talk about the fact that he's served 
as a confidential informant in the past in any form or 
fashion. That's out totally, in my estimation. Okay? So 
that's totally out. 
MR. JOHNSON: (Inaudible} and because of this case 
and the case (inaudible) he's trying to (inaudible). 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Well, you can call Agent Palmer as it 
relates to that if he independently goes to him and you can 
call him as it relates to -
MR. JOHNSON: I've decleared him as a witness and 
that's okay with Mr. Stewart (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't -
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible) . 
THE COURT: - I don't want, yeah, no you can't do 
that. I don't want a mistrial in this case. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's not a mistrial (inaudible). 
THE COURT: And it's delicate as it relates to that 
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in my estimation. So ... 
MR. STEWART: Well, when he's done I'd like to break 
(inaudible). 
THE COURT: Pardon me? 
MR. STEWART: When he's done I'd like to break for 
a (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, we can do it, we can do it right 
now because we've got to make a determination as it relates 
to the breadth of the direct examination from this point 
forward. 
MR. STEWART: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: We'll take another break. 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: We'll take another break so that we can 
discuss some legal matters outside the presence of the jury, 
and I will caution you not to discuss the case with anyone. 
If you've taken notes don't show those to anyone. Don't 
attempt to learn anything about the case outside this 
courtroom setting and avoid, of course, any radio, TV, 
newspaper comments about the trial. We'll take matters up 
outside the presence of the jury. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Mr. Holmer, you may be seated. 
The record will reflect that the jury has been 
excused and counsel wish to discuss some further legal 
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matters outside the presence of the jury and first of all in 
connection with that, Mr. Stewart, you may be heard. 
MR. STEWART: Judge, I think we're bordering on 
testimony here that could easily lead to a mistrial. Agent 
Holmer has mentioned other cases, he's mentioned in working 
with other state agents that won't be involved in this case, 
he's talked about matters that happened well after November 
7, 2013 and I think the jurors have almost heard enough that, 
to further implicate Mr. Edgar in other matters. 
second. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STEWART: Besides what we -
THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, you may be heard. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. Just a 
This testimony is 100 percent bourne out of a 
contact that was initiated by the defendant. The defendant 
took a great risk in doing this, doing it under the nose of 
his attorney at the time who as far as I know had no 
knowledge of this conversation. Anything he says to Agent 
Holmer is an admission by a party opponent and is admissible. 
It's relevant and frankly, under 403, it's not substantially 
more prejudicial than probative. While it is prejudicial to 
the defendant, it's certainly extremely probative of the 
defendant's knowledge, intent in possessing the controlled 
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be that, oh, it just was in the car, that he was borrowing 
from someone or whatever and he doesn't own what's in there. 
Certainly conversations to a DEA agent about trying to 
negotiate this case and another case that happened on 
November 21 st also in Lindon, the case officer in that case 
was Detective Palmer, deputy with - actually he was an 
officer with Provo Police Department who was with the Major 
Crimes Task Force at the time and during that interaction, 
two weeks after this case, the defendant tried to negotiate 
this case and that case with Detective Palmer. When that 
didn't work out, he then tried to negotiate this case with 
Agent Holmer and gave Agent Holmer information about his 
interactions with Detective Palmer. 
At sidebar, when we spoke about this a couple of 
sidebars ago, the Court said that we could go into what 
Detective Palmer's interaction and involvement was with this 
as long as I cautioned Agent Holmer to refer to his other 
cases as pending state drugs charges or pending Utah County 
drug charges or pending Lindon drug charges as opposed to 
saying there were multiple cases and I did instruct Agent 
Holmer about that and I've been trying to keep to that in 
directing my questions and so far I think we've done that. 
So then when we go and talk about Detective Palmer and then 
the objection is raised again, after we just said that was 
allowed, permissible, that's problematic for the State based 
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on the Court's prior ruling. 
Again, this is information that came to my 
attention because the defendant called Agent Holmer, gave 
Agent Holmer my name, gave Agent Holmer Detective Palmer's 
information and said this is what I can offer you, see what 
you can do with them, contact them and try to work out my 
case. This is nothing me seeking this out from the agent. 
He said as much. Agent never talked to Mr. Edgar before this 
happened, he wasn't seeking to set him up or something. This 
is a mess that was created by the defendant and while it's 
prejudicial and problematic and whatever you want to call it, 
it's still lawful under the rules of evidence and ummm, and 
so for that reason I think we should be allowed to continue 
in this vein of questioning. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stewart, anything further, sir? 
MR. STEWART: The prejudicial nature of the 
testimony, there's other cases, he's working with other 
officers here in state of Utah, that don't pertain 
necessarily to this case and we're looking at the facts for 
November 7, 2013 and what he was doing at that time. I 
think-
THE COURT: Okay. I will allow it as it relates to 
the breadth - now, my understanding would, was when I made 
the initial ruling that Officer Palmer would be a witness. 
Now I'm advised at the next sidebar that he would not be a 
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MR. JOHNSON: His case is -
THE COURT: (inaudible} . 
MR. JOHNSON: - sorry. His case is Monday's case. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. JOHNSON: I noticed Agent Holmer up as a 
witness for this hearing not Detective Palmer. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, then let's draw a line as 
it relates to representations relative to the other case that 
is going to be coming up on Monday and Tuesday in jury trial, 
13th and 14th of April and draw the line there. I would have 
drawn that line had I known that officer or Deputy Palmer was 
not going to be called as a witness in this particular case. 
Now, when he independently calls a federal officer 
as it relates to potential for that officer to be involved in 
this case and admitting that he may be useful in terms of 
drug traffickers, then that is admissible, that's admissible. 
He admits it. He made the contact. He independently did that 
and he was - so I think it's probative and - but we have to 
be very cautionary in my estimation as it relates to the next 
case and you probably have enough before the jury already 
relative to that independent contact by this defendant 
relative to the resolution of this case with a designation 
that he is able to supply them with high level traffickers. 
So let's - so -
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MR. JOHNSON: Okay, based on that ruling I'll wrap 
it up and we'll -
THE COURT: Yeah, wrap it up because I -
MR. JOHNSON: - I'll just have to accept that. 
THE COURT: - think we need to use a great deal of 
caution in my estimation, even though that's independently 
done on the part of the defendant probably which would have 
been against any recommendation or approval of his attorney 
at that point in time. Okay. 
Let's get the jury back in here and wrap it up. So 
I've sustained the objection, Mr. Stewart -
MR. JOHNSON: With respect to Detective Palmer's 
involvement. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I sustained the objection in part 
as it relates to the breadth and as it relates to Deputy 
Palmer. Okay. 
(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom) 
THE COURT: You may be seated. We're back on the 
record in the case of state of Utah vs. Michael Edgar, Case 
No. 131403330. Counsel and clients are present, the jury is 
seated and Mr. Johnson, you may continue with your 
examination of Mr. Brandon Holmer. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Agent Holmer, so after the 
defendant talked to you about his ability to access pounds of 
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heroin and a potential Mexican drug trafficker, did you 
indicate that you would contact me at his direction? 
A Yes. 
Q How were you suppose to get ahold of him after you 
spoke to me? 
A I was provided with a cell phone number. 
By? 
By Mr. Edgar. 
Q 
A 
Q And after some time in talking with me did you call 
that number back? 
Yes. 
And who did you speak with? 




Q Okay, and during that conversation did you indicate 
that you would not be working with him? 
A That is correct, I told him I would not be willing 
to work with him. 
Q 
A 
And is that the last you heard from him? 
Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay, that's all I have. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Cross examination? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. STEWART: 
Q So, when you get calls like this do you make 
records of those calls? 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING THE 
RECORD 
vs. 
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Dist. Ct. No. 131403330 
App. No. 20150605-CA 
Judge Lynn Davis 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on January 12, 2016, on 
request of the Court of Appeals to determine what happened at an unrecorded 
pre-trial bench conference. Craig Johnson appeared on behalf of the State, and 
Emily Adams appeared on behalf of Defendant Michael Edgar. 
Based on the testimony received at the hearing, the Court makes the 
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following findings of fact: 
1. Mr. Edgar was charged by Information with, among other things, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
2. The State amended the Information and charged Mr. Edgar with 
possession with intent to distribute within a drug-free zone. The 
State a leged in t e Amended Information that Mr. Edgar committed 
t e crime within 1,000 feet of a ba let sc ool. 
3. The ballet schoo, however, was over 1,000 feet from w ere Mr. 
Edgar was arrested. 
4. The trial in this case occurred on April 9-10, 2015. 
5. Around 8:30am on April 9, 2015, this Court, the prosecutor, and the 
defense attorney held an in-chambers conference. That conference 
was not recorded, although it was not the intent of the parties for the 
conference to be an on-the-record type of hearing; it was more of a 
conference where the attorneys touched base with the Court about 
the upcoming trial. 
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Information, where, for the first time, Mr. Edgar was charged with 
committing a crime within 1,000 feet of the "Ultimate Sports USA 
Baseball and Softball Training Facility to the NW, making it a drug-
free zone." 
7. The prosecutor wanted the police case officer to testify about the 
Ultimate Sports training facility, since he had measured its distance 
from the defendant's arrest, but t e defense attorney objected, 
arguing that t e officer's testimony lacked foundation. T e Court 
indicated that it would like y not a low the case officer's testimony 
about the Ultimate Sports training facility, but that the State could 
file the Second Amended Information if that State called the owner 
or operator of the Ultimate Sports training facility to establish the 
foundation for the new drug-free zone. 
8. The prosecutor and case officer then located one of the owners of 
one of the businesses located at the Ultimate Sports training facility 
on the morning of April 9, 2015, and she agreed to appear at trial 
later that day. The defense attorney did some Google research on the 
3 
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training facility briefly that morning. 
9. As aforementioned, the prosecutor did ask permission from this 
Court to file the Second Amended Information. The prosecutor 
based the Second Amended Information on the information from 
the police officer, and had he not had the testimony from the police 
officer, he would not ave asked for permission to fi e t e Second 
Amended Information. The Court granted permission to fi e the 
Second Amended Information as long as t e prosecutor cou d get 
one of the owners to testify and as long as t e defense attorney 
could interview the owner during a break at trial. 
10. The prosecutor and the defense attorney interviewed the owner for 
the first and only time during a break in the trial proceedings on the 
morning of April 8, 2015. 
11. The owner did testify at trial and was cross-examined at trial. 
12. As a result, the Court granted the State permission to file the Second 
Amended Information, which the defendant was convicted of, 
including the drug-free zone beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Approved as to form: 
Isl Crai~ Johnson 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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I hereby certify that on January 26, 2016, I efiled and therefore served a 
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Jeffrey Buhman 
Utah County Attorney 
Gregory Stewart 
Isl Emily Adams 
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